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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND 




The Bologna process—a major European integrating initiative in higher 
education started by the Bologna Declaration in 1999 and to be completed 
by 2010—seems to disregard one of the most significant recent develop-
ments in several major post-communist transition countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe: the rise and rapid growth of the private sectors in higher 
education and, more generally, the emergence of powerful market forces in 
higher education. Consequently, the ideas behind the Bologna process, the 
analytical tools, and policy recommendations it provides may have unantic-
ipated effects on higher education systems in certain Central and Eastern 
European countries. The growth of both the private sector in European 
(and especially Central and East European) higher education systems and 
the emergence of powerful market forces in the educational and research 
landscape in Europe warrant further consideration by the Bologna process 
if it is not to turn into a merely "theoretical," myopic exercise. The down-
playing of the role of market forces in higher education and research and 
development in the Bologna documents and the omission of the private sec-
tor (with its evident successes in some places and failures in other places) 
from the overall conceptual scheme of the Bologna process give potentially 
misguided signals to educational authorities in transition economies. 
Consequently, the Bologna process might thwart the development of the 
private sector in countries where chances for the expansion of the educa-
tional system otherwise than through privatization have been limited. The 
expansion of educational systems here is crucial for the implementation of 
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the Lisbon strategy of the European Union, as described briefly in the next 
section. Thus, while the implicit disrespect for market mechanisms in 
higher education may have limited impact in Western European systems, 
which have increasingly taken many market-related parameters of their 
operation in public universities for granted, it might have long-lasting neg-
ative impact on legislation and general attitude toward the private sector in 
some Central and Eastern European countries. With its magnitude, the role 
of the Bologna process in (indirectly) granting or refusing legitimacy to 
institutions across Europe is strong. This chapter is divided into the follow-
ing sections: the Bologna process within a Europe of Knowledge strategy; 
the role and legitimacy of private higher education; the denying of private 
sector legitimacy and the Bologna denigration of market forces in higher 
education; and conclusions. 
The Bologna Process within a Europe 
of Knowledge Strategy 
Recent attempts at the revitalization of the so-called Lisbon strategy of the 
European Union (through such widely debated documents like the Wim 
Kok Report, EC 2004a) seem to be going hand in hand with recent refor-
mulations of the Bologna process in European higher education (Reichert 
and Tauch 2005). The Lisbon strategy of 2000 is a comprehensive program 
for increasing EU competitiveness to be implemented in three large areas: 
economic, social, and environmental. It has set a strategic goal over the next 
decade: "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion." This goal requires setting up 
programs for building knowledge infrastructure, enhancing innovation and 
economic reform, and—of most interest to us here—"modernizing social 
welfare and education systems" (Lisbon Council 2000, p. 1).1 The future 
of Europe seems to be located in a Europe of Knowledge, to be achieved 
through redefined higher education gained from reformed educational 
institutions and through boosted research and development in both public 
and private sectors. New modes of viewing educational institutions are 
probed (universities as entrepreneurial providers of skilled workforce for the 
globalizing economy and students as individual clients/buyers of conve-
niently rendered educational services) and new ideas about citizens gaining 
enhanced European identity through education useful for knowledge-based 
Europe are presented (EC 1997; EC 2000d; EC 20036). 
Consequently, in recent years, the project of the European integration 
seems to have found a new leading motif: education and research for the 
Europe of Knowledge. At the same time, the Bologna process has been part 
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and parcel of these wider processes of European integration intended to lead 
to the emergence of the Europe of Knowledge and to the preservation of a 
distinctive European social model. A crucial component of the 
Europeanization process today is its attempt to make Europe a knowledge 
society (and, perhaps even more, a knowledge economy) in a globalizing 
world. Education and training (to use a more general EU terminology) 
became a core group of technologies to be used for the creation of a better 
integrated Europe. The EU has set itself the goal of creation of a distinctive 
and separate European Higher Education Area and a European Research (and 
Innovation) Area by the year 2010. The construction of a distinctive 
European educational policy space—and the introduction of the requisite 
European educational and research polices—has become an integral part of 
the EU revitalization within the wide cultural, political, and economic 
Europeanization project. As Martin Lawn writes, the emergence of a 
European education area is "fundamental to the contemporary structuring 
of the EU; it announces the arrival of a major discursive space, centered on 
education in which the legitimation, steering and shaping of European 
governance is being played out" (Lawn 2003, pp. 325-326). 
We are witnessing the emergence of a new Europe whose foundations are 
being constructed around such notions as knowledge, innovation, research, 
education and training. Education, and especially lifelong learning, 
becomes a new discursive space where European dreams of common citi-
zenship are currently located. However, this new knowledge-based Europe 
is becoming increasingly individualized; ideally, it consists of individual 
European learners rather than citizens of particular European nation-states. 
The emergent European educational space is unprecedented in its vision, 
ambitions, and capacity to influence national educational policies far beyond 
the current 25 EU member states. In the new knowledge economy, education 
policy, and especially higher education policy, it is argued, cannot remain 
solely at the level of Member States because a new sense of European identity 
can be best forged only through the construction of a new educational space 
in Europe. "Europeans," in this context, could refer directly to European (life-
long) learners, individuals investing their dreams for the future in a specific 
kind of knowledge—knowledge for the knowledge economy. 
Clearly then, the Bologna process needs to be viewed in a wider context 
provided by the idea of the Europe of Knowledge, to be achieved through 
the implementation of the Lisbon strategy. Most generally, the success of 
the Bologna process depends on the extent to which it is going to contribute 
toward the goals of the Lisbon strategy. Its goals, as initially formulated in 
2000, were numerous and multidirectional; consequently, most of them 
were not achievable. Current possible reformulations of the strategy, if it is 
going to stay alive in the years to come, may include leaving aside both its 
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environmental concerns and most of its social and welfare concerns. The 
major goals of the strategy would most likely be economic goals, mostly in 
the spirit already guiding the Lisbon strategy, if not exactly in letter. 
Thus the Bologna process is going to be successful if it contributes to the 
reformulated Lisbon strategy goals, mostly directed toward closer links 
between education and employability (if not direct employment, as differ-
entiated by Neave 2001) of its graduates, lower unemployment rates, and 
higher individual entrepreneurship of graduates. Some of the major 
Bologna goals that today clearly coincide with the goals of the Lisbon strat-
egy include more practically oriented higher education programs, shorter 
periods of study for the majority of students by a division between the 
undergraduate and graduate levels, lowering the number of students at 
the master level, greater intra-European student mobility through various 
EU-funded mobility schemes, and wider use of credit transfer systems, 
including within national frameworks. 
The Role and Legitimacy of Private Higher Education 
The role of the private sector in the countries of Western Europe—where 
the Bologna process was born—remains marginal. Major EU economies, 
including Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, do not have 
significant private sectors in higher education. But the Bologna process runs 
far beyond Western Europe to also involve countries where private higher 
education figures prominently, exceeding 10 percent of total enrollments in 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ukraine, 20 percent of enrollments in 
Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and 30 percent of enrollments in Estonia and 
Poland.' In 2004, over 700 private institutions (including 300 in Poland, 
200 in Ukraine, and 70 in Romania) functioned across Central and Eastern 
Europe, where all countries are already Bologna signatories. In Russia, pri-
vate enrollments exceeded 14 percent and the number of private institu-
tions reached almost 400. In sum, private sectors present a significant and 
rapidly developing segment of education—and economy—in Central and 
Eastern European countries, as testified by Tomusk (2004). 
Private institutions in Central and Eastern European countries serve a 
number of functions, both positive and negative: depending on the country, 
private institutions may provide fair access to affordable higher education 
but may also lead to the disintegration of the whole sector, especially if tight 
licensing and accrediting measures are not in place. These institutions 
continue to be grappling for legitimacy. The initial social acceptance was 
strongly impacted by the emergence of many of these institutions in a legal 
vacuum. Their creation can be attributed both to the enthusiasm for 
institutional autonomy and the appeal of hitherto nonexistent nonstate 
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educational institutions in new democracies. Currently, most private insti-
tutions in the region have been legalized, no longer having to operate on the 
fringes of the system and are recognized by local national accreditation 
boards. Their search for social recognition—reflecting the acceptance by the 
society, the labor market, and their state peers, however, continues. 
Private institutions presented the simplest venue toward the expansion 
of educational systems, which under communist rule were elite. Due to the 
rapid development of the private sector (and corresponding parallel expansion 
of the public sector), in some Central and Eastern European countries, 
higher education became an affordable product. Initial legitimacy of the 
private sector, in many cases, reflected the social acceptance of the fact that 
it provided affordable higher education to young people who would not have 
had a chance to receive it in the closed elite and fully public systems of the 
former communist countries. In knowledge-based societies, being cut off 
from affordable education may easily lead to social exclusion and marginal-
ization. Market legitimacy then evaluates the correspondence of the knowl-
edge portfolio received via education with current and future labor market 
needs. Finally, consumer-granted legitimacy reflects whether services 
delivered correspond to the personal and professional needs of graduates. 
There are Central and Eastern European countries in which the advantages 
and disadvantages of the existence of the private sector have to be carefully 
weighed: they have severe problems with the quality of instruction, shortage of 
qualified (and especially full-time) staff, appearing and disappearing institutions, 
institutions selling diplomas in a "diploma mill" manner, and so on. 
Private institutions are not subsidized by the state except in some cases in 
some countries; in general, they are almost fully subsidized by students who 
purchase their teaching services. As a result, the private sector is mostly a 
teaching sector, with no accompanying research carried out. Consequently, 
private institutions derive a strong degree of their legitimacy from their stu-
dents and their families who recognize them as institutions providing services 
worth paying for. In many cases, being market-driven and consumer-driven 
in their orientation, private institutions are more flexible to adapt their cur-
ricula according to demand, open short-term courses, offer MBA programs, 
liaise with foreign institutions and offer dual degrees, provide distance educa-
tion, weekend education, and other modes of learning convenient to the 
student. Often private institutions monitor the labor market, open career cen-
ters for their graduates, and introduce explicit internal quality assurance 
mechanisms. Many follow market mechanisms in their functioning as busi-
ness units, use public relations and marketing tools to have significant 
portions of local, regional, or national educational "markets," and finally pre-
pare their graduates for living and working in market realities. They have also 
exerted huge impact on academicians themselves. 
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Many of the above aspects of private institutions in transition 
countries—and often in contrast to many public institutions—correspond 
closely to what the Lisbon strategy in general suggests for the education sec-
tor in the future. From a certain perspective, it can be argued that most 
ideas developed in theory in Western Europe and referred to as the Bologna 
process were actually applied in practice in the private sector in Central and 
Eastern European countries (those in which the sector exists more than 
marginally) already in the 1990s, before the ideas of the Bologna process 
were formulated. The Lisbon strategy in general, and the EU publications 
about the European Research Area in particular, stress the importance of 
market forces, individual entrepreneurship of graduates, and new modes of 
governance of academic institutions; both underlie the perspective of the 
end-user of knowledge that is the student—rather than its provider, the aca-
demic institution. The overall emphasis moves away from the respectable 
and trustful institution toward the consumer of educational services. 
However, the direction of the Bologna process with respect to the Lisbon 
strategy remains unclear. Above all, the Bologna process seems to downplay 
the role of market forces in higher education and research and development 
and omit to consider the private sector that is booming in the transition 
countries in its overall conceptual scheme. 
The Denying of Private Sector Legitimacy and the 
Bologna Denigration of Market Forces in 
Higher Education 
Despite its intergovernmental (rather than EU) origins, the Bologna process 
has come to he viewed as an instrument for wider processes of European 
integration and for wider attempts to preserve a European social model. It 
is not accidental that there is a common deadline for the Bologna process, 
the EU Lisbon Agenda of transformations of education, welfare, and econ-
omy and the Brugges-Copenhagen process for the integration of European 
vocational education. The differences between higher education and 
research in the old EU Member States (EU-15) and the new EU entrants, 
not to mention other East European Bologna signatory countries, in 
general, are critical. Higher education in the majority of Bologna-signatory 
transition countries has been in a state of crisis for over a decade now. While 
higher education systems in Western European countries seem to face new 
challenges brought about by the emergence of the knowledge-based econ-
omy, globalization, and market-related pressures, most of the Bologna 
signatory transition countries face old challenges as well, in varying degrees 
with the need of expansion of their systems at the forefront. 
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The Bologna process in general seems to focus mostly on new challenges 
and new problems; most transition countries, by contrast, are still embedded 
in old-type problems generated predominantly in the recent decade by the 
need for massification of higher education under severe resource constraints. 
Bologna-related reforms undertaken in Western Europe are much more 
functional (fine-tuning, slight changes, etc.); reforms in most Central and 
Eastern European countries, by contrast, need to be much more substantial 
(or structural). There is little common ground between the two sets of 
reforms except for technical details and the Bologna process in its official 
documents so far seems not to have drawn a sufficiently clear distinction 
between functional and structural reforms needed in different parts of 
Europe. Even though the passage to mass systems in Western Europe has 
been well documented, the current process toward massification of higher 
education in the transition countries is taking place under different condi-
tions. Therefore, few available recommendations based on the expansion 
experiences of the EU countries from two-three decades ago exist to the 
countries of transition. Major suggestions for Western European institutions 
of higher education may not be sufficient to guide institutions in transition 
countries. Blind acceptance of the Bologna process and especially blind 
acceptance of its general conceptual framework may have far reaching 
consequences for educational systems in these countries. The future of the 
private sector in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, despite its 
controversial role in some of them, is a good example here. 
The growing demand for higher education—clearly Daniel C. Levy's 
"demand-absorbing" wave of the growth of the private sector—gave rise to 
the booming of private higher education institutions in several transition 
countries. While, apparently, the rapidly developing private sector seems of 
marginal importance for the Bologna process in Western Europe (and per-
haps therefore it has not been dealt with in the Bologna documents so far), 
it certainly is a problem (and/or solution) for some transition 
countries, where private sectors play a significant role, including Poland, 
Ukraine, Estonia, and Romania. The rapid development of private higher 
education as well as the emergence of powerful market forces on the educa-
tional and research landscape of most transition countries, I believe, require 
further analyses, and, consequently, the consideration into the debates 
accompanying the implementation of the Bologna process on a European 
scale. So far, by ignoring the booming private sector in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and thereby ignoring powerful market forces 
and market mechanisms in higher education there, the Bologna process 
appears to be indirectly refusing legitimacy to institutions of private higher 
education. The fact that the Bologna process does not use the word "market" or 
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the word "private," in transition countries that still have their systems in 
flux, and have no guidance on how to expand access to higher education 
under severe state underfunding, suggests a refusal to grant legitimacy to the 
sector, an indirect rejection of the competition between the public and pri-
vate sectors, and an implicit suggestion that the existence of market mecha-
nisms in teaching and research is fundamentally wrong.3  
Yet, it is the private institutions, which, especially in transition countries 
with larger private sectors, are often closer to the recommendations of the 
Lisbon strategy than public institutions. And the Bologna process becomes 
increasingly part of a much larger social and economic transformation of 
Europe epitomized by this strategy. The Bologna game in higher education 
is the most powerful game in town in most transition countries; for most 
governments in these countries, it provides the best rationale available for 
reforming the systems. The number of signatory countries already exceeds 
40. Bologna provides a major impetus for the otherwise often static systems, 
and the idea of catching up with a larger European trend is often much bet-
ter received by the general public in these countries than in Western 
European countries. More so, in some non-EU transition countries follow-
ing Bologna requirements is even regarded as bringing the country closer to 
the EU, or seen as a temporary substitute for EU membership. 
As a result, the Bologna process is one of the most ambitious transfor-
mations of higher education systems on a regional scale in the world today. 
Its impact on the future of European higher education is potentially deep 
and long-lasting (as is potentially the impact of the emergence of the 
European Research Area, discussed in Kwiek 2006). Since the very begin-
ning, the Sorbonne Declaration, through the Bologna Declaration—Prague 
and Berlin summits (2001 and 2003), as well as from the Salamanca (2001) 
to the Graz (2003) to the most recent Glasgow (2005) declarations of higher 
education institutions, the private sector has been neglected as a topic of 
educational analysis. As an example, in the most recent European University 
Association's Glasgow Declaration "Strong Universities for Strong Europe," 
the word "private" appears once (private funding), and the word "market" 
appears twice: labor market and employment market (Glasgow Declaration 
2005). For the official documents and accompanying reports of the 
Bologna process, the private sector does not exist. While declarations and 
communiques of the Bologna process have not made a single reference to 
private higher education in the last seven years, Trends III report of 150 
pages (prepared for the Berlin summit of Bologna signatories in 2003) men-
tions the term half-a-dozen times but only in connection with the GATS 
negotiations, as if the issue of the rapidly emerging private sector and an 
increasing market orientation of higher education institutions both globally 
and in many Bologna signatory countries were irrelevant. The situation is 
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not different in the recently published Trends IV report: the word "private" 
appears four times but never in connection with the higher education sector; 
the word "market" appears more than a dozen times but almost exclusively 
in relation to the labor market. There are also no indications that the notion 
of "competition" is taken seriously by the report, either in its spirit or as part 
of the vocabulary used in the body of the text (Reichert and Tauch 2005). 
The omissions go against global trends in which the role of the private sec-
tor in teaching and research is on the rise, market forces are a significant 
part of the educational and research landscape, and the competition for 
students, public, and private research funds, and competition between 
institutions and faculty is an important factor (Altbach 1999; Levy 2003). 
Consequently, the ideas behind Bologna, the analytical tools it provides, 
the wider picture of the role of higher education in society and economy, 
and policy recommendations it develops may have unanticipated and 
mixed effects on higher education systems, especially in Eastern (rather 
than Central) Europe where it is still possible to grant or refuse legal legiti-
macy, for example through new legislation. To be an effective integrating 
tool on an European scale, the Bologna process would need to take into 
account the fundamental difference between Western European countries 
and some transition countries with respect to the role of the private sector 
and the role of market mechanisms in higher education. In most transition 
countries (especially in Central Europe), private institutions currently play 
a significant role. 
At the same time the role of the private sector in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe—considering its ability to adapt to the new societal 
needs and new market conditions combined with the drastically under-
funded and still unreformed public institutions with limited capacities to 
enroll larger numbers of students—and despite its lack of recognition on 
the part of the Bologna process is bound to grow. Private institutions repre-
sent a wide variety of missions, organizational frameworks, legal status, and 
relations to the established institutional order. What is needed is the disin-
terested analysis of the current (in-transition) state of affairs, largely unex-
plored so far in international educational research, and conclusions as to 
how to deal, in theory and in practice, with growing market forces in 
education; how to regulate privatization and corporatization of educational 
institutions and research activities within ongoing reform attempts, and 
finally how to accommodate principles of the European Research Area and 
requirements of the Bologna process to local conditions of new EU coun-
tries. Unfortunately, the Bologna process in its current form, in general, 
remains indifferent to these developments even though their appearance in 
transition countries might prefigure many future options that Western 
European policymakers might face. 
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Conclusions 
The refusal of legitimacy to private higher education and the market forces 
in education in general within the Bologna process may lead to a limitation 
in the expansion of higher education system as a whole, in numerous 
Central and Eastern European countries where the private sector has not 
been developed so far. In Central and East European transition countries, 
educational business is increasingly private, teaching-focused, and market-
driven. It does not seem to change the substance of the implementation of 
the Bologna process but it does affect the overall functioning of the two sec-
tors in transition countries and consequently the effectiveness of Bologna 
reform strategies. There is a strong market-driven competition for students 
between private institutions, and a strong competition for faculty between 
private and public institutions. Transition countries, generally, have to start 
or already cope with the rapid massification of their systems, with the num-
ber of students being on the rise. The Bologna process has been developed 
for Western European countries and now it is being implemented from 
Portugal to the Caucasus. In most of them, the process is viewed in terms of 
"catching up" with the West, quite often as a substitute for the political inte-
gration. At the same time, long-term consequences of the process for 
national education systems with vastly different problems are unclear. 
Unfortunately, major Bologna-related documents do not seem to take the 
problem of both the private sector and the market forces in higher educa-
tion into account. The overall revitalization of the European integration 
project through education, and the accompanying production of the new 
European citizenship, may bring about unexpected effects in transition 
countries in which welfare state regimes are different, higher education sys-
tems and labor markets have their own traditions, and which generally are 
at different stages of economic development. Strong private sector and pow-
erful market forces can be viewed as good examples of significant (but so far 
neglected) differences between the countries where the Bologna ideas were 
horn and the countries where these ideas are currently, almost unanimously, 
implemented. 
Private higher education and strong market forces in education in tran-
sition countries require careful analysis in European educational research. 
Little known in the old EU-15 (except for example Portugal, the 
Netherlands, or the United Kingdom), they may indicate more global 
trends and tendencies, to be seen in the old EU-15 in the future. Both seri-
ous problems and excellent solutions brought about by the private sector in 
transition countries deserve careful research attention. The Bologna 
process, neglecting these developments, is an example of how experiences in 
the peripheral European countries can be out of research focus today. 
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Notes 
1. The shift to a digital, knowledge-based economy is a powerful engine for growth 
and competitiveness, the strategy argues. Consequently, the document affirmed 
the idea of a European Area of Research and Innovation. The necessary steps men-
tioned for the education sector include e.g. developing mechanisms for net-
working, improving the environment for private research investment, research 
and development partnerships and high technology start-ups, encouraging the 
development of an "open method of coordination" for the benchmarking of 
national research and development policies, taking steps to increase the mobility 
of researchers and introducing Community-wide patents (Lisbon Council 2000, 
pp. 3-4). The targets set in Lisbon for education included a substantial annual 
increase in per capita investment in human resources, the number of 18 to 24 
year olds who are not in further education and training to be halved by 2010, 
schools and training centers to be developed into "multi-purpose local learning 
centers" accessible to all, and the development of a European framework defin-
ing the new basic skills to be provided by lifelong learning and defining a com-
mon European format for curricula vitae. 
2. Consider, for example, the robust growth of the Polish private higher education 
sector. Until the collapse of Communism in Poland in 1989, higher education 
there was fully controlled by the state. A new Higher Education Act of 1990 
paved the way to the development of the private sector in general and a 
Vocational Higher Education Schools Act of 1997 provided legal grounds for 
lower-level vocational private sector. The number of private institutions rose 
from 3 in 1991 to 250 in 2002 and 301 in 2005. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, the private sector has changed the educational landscape in Poland 
beyond recognition. In the last decade and a half, the number of students rose 
more than four times, from about 400 000 in 1990/1991 to over 1 900 000 in 
2004/2005. In academic 2004/2005, almost one third of the student body (over 
30 percent) went for private higher education institutions. In recent years, 
private higher education institutions have been developing smoothly and under 
the close supervision of the Ministry of Education. They have become a chal-
lenge to public institutions. Their increasing number has also increased the 
accessibility of the higher education system as a whole. Private institutions, espe-
cially in smaller towns, often provide the only available form of higher education 
(which is also cheaper than public education in university cities when accom-
modation costs are taken into account). 
3. The strangeness of omitting private dynamics is illustrated by data on public 
funding for higher education. Poland's public funding (1995-2004) has gener-
ally been between 0.8 and 0.9 percent of GDP, a figure slightly lower than those 
in other EU countries (For 2001, from 0.8 in Italy and the United Kingdom up 
to 1.5 in Sweden and 1.8 in Denmark, respectively (combined with private 
funding, the percentage of GDP for education in these countries was: 0.9 in 
Italy, 1.0 in Germany, 1.1 in France and the United Kingdom, 1.2 in Spain, 1.3 
in the Netherlands and Ireland and 1.8 in Denmark). The highest percentage of 
private funds spent on higher education as a share of GDP has been 0.3 (Spain, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom). 
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